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IN RE: MARCUS DEANGELO LEE, a.k.a. Marcus DeAngelo Jones,
Movant
   No. 17-6038
On Motion to Authorize the Filing of a Second or
Successive Application for Habeas Corpus Relief.
United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
No. 2:16-cv-02932—Sheryl H. Lipman, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: January 17, 2018.
Before: McKEAGUE, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
ORDER
_________________________

PER CURIAM. Marcus DeAngelo Lee pleaded guilty to three crimes in Tennessee state court, served his sentences, and was released from state custody in 1998. State v. Lee, No. W2016-00107-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 416292, at *1–2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2017). Twenty years later and while serving time in federal prison for a subsequent crime, Lee asks this court for permission to file a second § 2254 petition attacking his state convictions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). He also moves to remand the action to the district court. But the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over Lee’s petition regardless of whether he can meet § 2244(b)’s requirements, so we deny both motions. See Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). Although we do not scrutinize the statutory timeliness of a habeas petition at this stage, In re McDonald, 514 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2008), we can—and must—determine whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction over a case before proceeding at all. Answers in Genesis, 556 F.3d at 465 (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.”).

. . .

Accordingly, we DISMISS Lee’s motion for an order authorizing a second or successive § 2254 petition. We also DENY Lee’s other pending motion as moot.



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MARIBEL TRUJILLO DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, Attorney General,
Respondent.
   No. 17-3669
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A 088 922 375.
Decided and Filed: January 17, 2018
Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. In this immigration case, Maribel Trujillo Diaz petitions for review of an order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. The United States Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ruled that Trujillo Diaz failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA” or “Act”) because she failed to show that she would be singled out individually for persecution based on her family membership. The BIA reiterated this finding in ruling that Trujillo Diaz failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture. Because the BIA failed to credit the facts stated in Trujillo Diaz’s declarations, and this error undermined its conclusion as to the sufficiency of Trujillo Diaz’s prima facie evidence, we hold that the BIA abused its discretion. We further hold that the BIA abused its discretion in summarily rejecting Trujillo Diaz’s argument that she could not safely relocate internally in Mexico for purposes of showing a prima facie case of eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture. Thus, we vacate the order of the BIA and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



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JULIE PEFFER; JESSE PEFFER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MIKE STEPHENS,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 17-1072
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:15-cv-00078—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: January 17, 2018
Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
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JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to determine the extent of the Fourth Amendment’s requirements for an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the residence of an individual suspected of committing a crime involving the use of a computer.

That issue figures prominently in Plaintiffs Julie and Jesse Peffer’s appeal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Mike Stephens, a detective sergeant with the Michigan State Police, as to the Peffers’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. This claim arises from a search of the Peffers’ home in Reed City, Michigan, and from the seizure of computer equipment and other items and documents from this residence pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of Sergeant Stephens’s sworn affidavit. According to the Peffers, the affidavit (which was incorporated into the warrant by reference) failed to support a finding of probable cause for the search and seizure because it did not sufficiently allege any criminal activity or any connection between such activity and the house.

The district court granted summary judgment for Sergeant Stephens, holding that the warrant was supported by probable cause and that, in the alternative, Sergeant Stephens was entitled to qualified immunity.1 For the reasons explained below, we affirm.