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SALVATORE LOVANO,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
   No. 16-3245
Upon Petition for Review from the
Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A 031 242 252.
Decided and Filed: January 20, 2017
Before: GILMAN, GRIFFIN, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges


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OPINION
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RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Salvatore Lovano is a native and citizen of Canada who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 1973. In 2015, an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered that Lovano be removed from the United States for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), a statute that authorizes the deportation of “[a]ny alien . . . convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.” The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s order. Lovano now petitions for review of the BIA’s opinion, arguing that his 2012 conviction for aggravated assault in Ohio is not a crime involving moral turpitude. For the reasons set forth below, we DENY Lovano’s petition for review



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RONALD KELLY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ALAN J. LAZAROFF, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 15-3950
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 5:14-cv-01217—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Argued: December 9, 2016
Decided and Filed: January 20, 2017
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BOGGS, and SILER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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BOGGS, Circuit Judge. This is a procedurally complicated habeas case involving two “layered” claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2010, Ronald Kelly was convicted of felony murder, felonious assault, and assault in Ohio state court for his involvement in a fight near Kent State University and was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life imprisonment. After his conviction, Kelly raised several claims on direct appeal, including a claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. In a dramatic twist, however, Kelly’s counsel on direct appeal included the wife and business partner of his trial counsel. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Kelly’s direct appeal and state post-conviction claims before the Ohio state courts were unsuccessful. Armed with new counsel, Kelly brought a new claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition in federal court, advancing a theory of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness that had not been fully presented before the Ohio state courts. Kelly also argued that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a claim that had been properly presented before the Ohio state courts, and that his appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse his procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim under the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). The district court rejected both of his arguments, concluding that the actions of Kelly's appellate counsel, even if allegedly ineffective, could not excuse Kelly’s procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, and that his ineffective-assistance-of-appellatecounsel claim could not overcome AEDPA deference. We affirm.