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JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MIAMI UNIVERSITY; STEVEN ELLIOT; ROSE MARIE WARD; ALANA VAN GRUNDY-YODER; JAYNE BROWNELL; SUSAN VAUGHN,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 17-3396
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:15-cv-00605—Michael R. Barrett, District Judge.
Argued: November 29, 2017
Decided and Filed: February 9, 2018
Before: GUY, MOORE, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In the fall of 2014, John Doe and Jane Doe were students at Miami University, a public university located in Oxford, Ohio. The two students knew each other and had engaged in several consensual “physical encounters.” This case arises from an incident between John and Jane on September 14, 2014. Both parties had consumed alcohol, and John states that he was so intoxicated that he cannot remember what occurred. According to Jane’s statement, the two engaged in some consensual sexual acts, but at some point Jane stopped consenting and John continued to engage in then non-consensual sexual acts for some period of time before he stopped. This accusation of sexual misconduct was evaluated by Miami University, and John was found responsible for violating the school’s sexual-assault policy. He was initially suspended for approximately eight months, but this suspension was reduced by the University on appeal to four months. After the University’s appeals process affirmed the original finding of responsibility, John brought suit against Jane, Miami University, and individual University employees who had been part of the disciplinary process. John voluntarily dismissed his claims against Jane after the two parties reached a settlement. The other defendants moved to dismiss John’s six remaining claims under Title IX and § 1983 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court granted their motion.

On appeal, John argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of John’s Title IX hostile-environment claim, Title IX deliberate-indifference claim, and § 1983 substantive-due-process claim. Furthermore, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court’s dismissal of John’s § 1983 procedural-due-process and equal-protection claims and related finding of qualified immunity. We REVERSE the district court’s holding that John did not sufficiently plead his Title IX erroneous-outcome claim. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.