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GAYLE LINKLETTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WESTERN & SOUTHERN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.; KIM CHIODI,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 16-3265
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:15-cv-00162—Timothy S. Black, District Judge.
Argued: January 24, 2017
Decided and Filed: March 23, 2017
Before: MERRITT, CLAY, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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MERRITT, Circuit Judge. In this Fair Housing Act case that was dismissed for failure to state a valid claim, the plaintiff, Gayle Linkletter, signed an online petition supporting a Cincinnati women’s shelter, the Anna Louise Inn, after she had accepted a position with the defendant, Western & Southern. Western & Southern rescinded its employment agreement with Linkletter because she signed the petition while the company was engaged in a lengthy real estate dispute with the women’s shelter over its location in the neighborhood. Residents of the shelter had previously sued Western & Southern in federal court under the Fair Housing Act, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 3617. As a result of that earlier litigation, Western & Southern reached a settlement with the shelter and purchased the property. After Linkletter’s employment contract was rescinded she sued Western & Southern and its employee, Kim Chiodi, under § 3617 and the state analog in the Ohio Civil Rights Act. Section 3617 states in the part relevant to this case as follows:

It shall be unlawful to . . . interfere with any person . . . on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.1

Specifically, Linkletter claims her petition-signing encouraged the residents of the women’s shelter in their rights granted by § 3604, involving discrimination in the rental or sale of housing:

[I]t shall be unlawful . . . (a) To refuse to sell or rent . . . or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . sex . . . . (b) To discriminate . . . in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . sex . . . . (c) To make, print, or publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . sex . . . . (d) To represent to any person because of . . . sex . . . that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available . . . . (e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular . . . sex . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(e).

We conclude that Linkletter presents a plausible claim for relief. Taking the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, Linkletter’s petition-signing supporting the shelter fits within the meaning of the phrase “aided or encouraged” and the defendants’ rescission of their employment agreement constitutes an “interference” with that encouragement. Accordingly, the district court was in error when it granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and we reverse the judgment.



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DAN MILLER, SUEDE NIGHTS, LLC, JOSEPH CIRINO, and SPOT 82, LLC (16-3052); JULIOUS MOSLEY and MOSLEY MOTEL OF CLEVELAND, INC. (16-3053),
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF WICKLIFFE, OHIO,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 16-3052/3053
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
Nos. 1:12-cv-01248; 1:13-cv-01646—James S. Gwin, District Judge.
Argued: November 29, 2016
Decided and Filed: March 23, 2017
Before: NORRIS, GIBBONS, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants Dan Miller, Joseph Cirino, Julious Mosley, and their respective businesses—Suede Nights, Spot 82, and the Mosley Motel—appeal the district court’s summary-judgment orders in favor of defendant Wickliffe, Ohio. Appellants allege that the city violated their constitutional rights by passing an ordinance that required a “nightclub” permit for certain establishments. The district court determined that appellants lacked standing and dismissed the case on those grounds but also reached the merits of appellants’ claims and held that the Wickliffe’s conduct did not offend the Constitution.

Plaintiffs here lack standing to challenge, as-applied or facially, the nightclub ordinance. Because they cannot demonstrate that Wickliffe had reached a final decision under the ordinance, or that they faced a credible threat of prosecution under it, plaintiffs cannot show a particularized and concrete injury sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims.



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ROGER L. WHEELER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
THOMAS L. SIMPSON, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 11-5707
On Remand from the United States Supreme Court.
No. 3:09-cv-00336—Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Chief District Judge.
Argued: October 1, 2014
Decided and Filed: March 23, 2017
Before: MERRITT, GRIFFIN, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. This habeas case returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court. Previously, this court granted habeas relief to petitioner Roger Wheeler based on the state trial court’s decision to remove a juror who could not give sufficient assurance of neutrality or impartiality in considering whether to impose the death penalty. See Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366, 374–75 (6th Cir.), rev’d sub nom. White v. Wheeler, 136 S. Ct. 456 (2015) (per curiam). Our majority opinion also addressed and rejected petitioner’s other claims relating to the guilt phase of the state trial proceedings, but left unresolved other claims relating to the penalty phase. See id. at 375. Both Wheeler and respondent Thomas Simpson (“Warden”) filed petitions for certiorari. The Supreme Court denied Wheeler’s petition, Wheeler v. White, 136 S. Ct. 688 (2015), but granted the Warden’s, reversing our decision to issue the writ and remanding for further proceedings, White, 136 S. Ct. at 462. We now address petitioner’s remaining claims certified for appeal. After doing so, we affirm the judgment of the district court.