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DAVID L. ENGLER, Administrator of the Estate of Deceased T.F., a minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAVID ARNOLD, individually,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 16-4201
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.
No. 4:15-cv-02019—Sara E. Lioi, District Judge.
Argued: June 13, 2017
Decided and Filed: July 10, 2017
Before: MOORE, GILMAN and COOK, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. T.F., a minor child, was abused and eventually killed by his stepfather. It is alleged that prior to T.F.’s death, Defendant David Arnold, the Interim Executive Director of the Mahoning County Children’s Services Board, received reports about this abuse, but did not investigate or cooperate with law enforcement, as was required by state statute. David L. Engler, as administrator of T.F.’s estate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Arnold, alleging substantive and procedural due-process violations. Arnold filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted. On appeal, Engler argues that he should prevail under a state-created-danger theory because Arnold increased the risk of harm to T.F.

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting Arnold’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RANDALL SUTTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 16-5587
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.
No. 2:05-cr-00090-1—David L. Bunning, District Judge.
Argued: April 26, 2017
Decided and Filed: July 10, 2017
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, BATCHELDER, and STRANCH.


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OPINION
_________________________

In 2005, Defendant Randall Sutton committed four armed bank robberies in quick succession in Kentucky and in Ohio. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the Kentucky charges in the Southern District of Ohio and the case was properly transferred from the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although Defendant pleaded guilty to the Ohio charges in the Southern District of Ohio, he never formally entered a guilty plea to the Kentucky charges, but was nevertheless sentenced in the Southern District of Ohio as if he had. No one seemed to notice, however—not the defendant, not the government, not the district court—until five years later, when Defendant filed a motion in the Southern District of Ohio to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging his conviction and sentence on the Kentucky charges on the ground that he never pleaded guilty to those charges. The Southern District of Ohio vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the Kentucky charges and transferred the case back to the Eastern District of Kentucky, where he was arraigned and then entered a not guilty plea, nearly eleven years after he had been indicted. He then filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that his speedy trial rights had been violated under both the Speedy Trial Act (STA), 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., and the Sixth Amendment, which the Eastern District of Kentucky court denied. The question is whether this oversight violated Defendant’s rights under either the STA or the Sixth Amendment.

. . .

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM ALAN SCHOCK,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 16-2503
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:16-cr-00025-1—Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: July 10, 2017
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. William Schock was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to the sexual exploitation of a minor. In this appeal, Schock challenges the application of a § 2G2.1(d)(1) sentencing enhancement for multiple victims and claims that the district court imposed a fine that violates both the statutory maximum penalty and the Eighth Amendment. Because the district court erred by applying § 2G2.1(d)(1), we vacate Schock’s sentence and remand for resentencing.



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GARY EDWARD WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
   Nos. 16-5979/6105
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:12-cv-00334—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.
Argued: March 16, 2017
Decided and Filed: July 10, 2017
Before: BOGGS, ROGERS, and COOK, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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ROGERS, Circuit Judge. After recovering what amounted to workers’ compensation benefits under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) for injuries incurred as a postal worker, plaintiff Gary Williamson sought damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical malpractice on the part of the Department of Veterans Affairs in the treatment of those injuries. Liability under FECA, however, is “exclusive” of “all other liability of the United States” to the employee “under a Federal tort liability statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (2012). Because this exclusion applies broadly even when a work-related injury has been negligently treated by an entirely non-work-related federal hospital, plaintiff Williamson may not recover under the FTCA.