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FLIGHT OPTIONS, LLC; FLEXJET, LLC; ONESKY FLIGHT, LLC; FLIGHT OPTIONS HOLDING I, INC.,
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants-Appellants,
v.
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 1108; INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AIRLINE DIVISION,
Defendants/Counter-Claimants-Appellees.
   No. 16-3606
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:16-cv-00732—James S. Gwin, District Judge.
Argued: February 1, 2017
Decided and Filed: July 17, 2017
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; COOK and WHITE, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. This action under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) concerns the merger of two airlines—an acquiring airline with unionized pilots and an acquired airline with newly unionized pilots—and their efforts to bring both groups under a new, joint collective-bargaining agreement. The airlines and their pilots’ union dispute whether the creation of an integrated seniority list (ISL) of pilots is exclusively committed to the union, or whether it is subject to collective bargaining with the airlines. The union asks us to find this disagreement to be a “major” dispute under the RLA and to affirm the district court’s preliminary injunction ordering the airlines to accept the ISL proffered to them by the union. The airlines ask us to find this dispute to be “minor” and subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction, and to vacate the preliminary injunction. The airlines assert the right not to accept a unionproffered seniority list and instead to participate in the seniority-integration process through collective bargaining. Because this assertion is not arguably justified by the parties’ existing collective-bargaining agreement, the dispute is major, leading us to AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
HATEM ATAYA, M.D.,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 16-2611
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal Based on Appeal Waiver in Plea Agreement
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:15-cr-20351-3—Sean F. Cox, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: July 17, 2017
Before: NORRIS, GIBBONS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
ORDER
_________________________

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. Hatem Ataya pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit health care fraud and wire fraud. His plea agreement included an appellate waiver, in which he relinquished any right to appeal his conviction or sentence “on any grounds.” R. 145 at 11–12. Atatya nonetheless appealed the judgment against him, and the government moved to dismiss on the basis of the waiver. While we agree with the government that Ataya knowingly waived his appellate rights, we are not convinced that Ataya entered into the plea agreement as a whole knowingly and voluntarily. We therefore refer this case to the merits panel to determine whether the plea agreement and the district court adequately informed Ataya of his plea’s consequences, in particular any possibility of denaturalization, and if not whether any omissions constitute plain error.



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RICHARD A. CROSBY, PH.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY,
Defendant,

ELI CAPILOUTO; TIMOTHY TRACY, Ph.D.; WILLIAM EUGENE THRO; WAYNE T. SANDERSON, Ph.D., CIH; TERRY ALLEN, in their individual and personal capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 16-6598
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:15-cv-00276—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge.
Argued: April 26, 2017
Decided and Filed: July 17, 2017
Before: MERRITT, GILMAN, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Richard A. Crosby, a tenured professor at the University of Kentucky’s College of Public Health, appeals from the dismissal of his claims against various administrative officials affiliated with the University. He brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Kentucky state law in connection with his removal as Chair of the Department of Health Behavior. Crosby argues on appeal that, contrary to the district court’s holding, his removal amounted to an actionable deprivation of his protected property and liberty interests without due process of law under both the U.S. Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution. He also asserts that the defendants are not protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Finally, Crosby claims that the defendants are liable under Kentucky contract law for monetary damages caused by his removal. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.