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UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA LOCAL 3047, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
HARDIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
   No. 16-5246
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:15-cv-00066—David J. Hale, District Judge.
Argued: October 18, 2016
Decided and Filed: November 18, 2016
Before: BOGGS, SUHRHEINRICH, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. This case presents a challenge by numerous collective bargaining organizations to a Kentucky county’s so-called “right to work” ordinance. The Unions contend the ordinance is unenforceable because it is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.

The district court awarded summary judgment to the unions, holding that the ordinance is preempted. The court recognized that the NLRA expressly excepts from preemption such rightto-work protections under “State law,” but held that the law of a State’s political subdivision is not “State law.” For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.



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STRYKER CORPORATION; HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA.,
Defendant,

TIG INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
   Nos. 15-1657/1664
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:05-cv-00051—Robert Holmes Bell, District Judge.
Argued: July 27, 2016
Decided and Filed: November 18, 2016
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and COOK, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
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COLE, Chief Judge. Stryker Corporation has been engaged in a longstanding row with XL Insurance America, Inc. (its commercial umbrella insurer) and TIG Insurance Company (its excess liability insurer). Fifteen years by our count. See Stryker Corp. v. XL Ins. Am., 576 F. App’x 496 (6th Cir. 2014); Stryker Corp. v. XL Ins. Am., 735 F.3d 349 (6th Cir. 2012); Stryker Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 681 F.3d 819 (6th Cir. 2012). That insurance-coverage dispute, in its current incarnation, requires us to interpret the “consent-to-settle” provision of an excess-liability policy. The district court thought that the insurance contract contained a latent ambiguity, construed the policy against TIG, and entered summary judgment for Stryker. But the contract is not ambiguous, in any sense of the word, so we reverse.