WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.

Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Federal Circuit

No. 16-1011. Argued April 16, 2018--Decided June 22, 2018

Petitioner WesternGeco LLC owns patents for a system used to survey the ocean floor. Respondent ION Geophysical Corp. began selling a competing system that was built from components manufactured in the United States, shipped to companies abroad, and assembled there into a system indistinguishable from WesternGeco’s. WesternGeco sued for patent infringement under 35 U. S. C. 271(f)(1) and (f)(2). The jury found ION liable and awarded WesternGeco damages in royalties and lost profits under 284. ION moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that WesternGeco could not recover damages for lost profits because 271(f) does not apply extraterritorially. The District Court denied the motion, but the Federal Circuit reversed. ION was liable for infringement under 271(f)(2), the court reasoned, but 271(f) does not allow patent owners to recover for lost foreign profits On remand from this Court in light of Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 579 U. S. ____, the Federal Circuit reinstated the portion of its decision regarding 271(f)’s extraterritoriality.

Held: WesternGeco’s award for lost profits was a permissible domestic application of 284 of the Patent Act. Pp. 4–10.

(a) The presumption against extraterritoriality assumes that federal statutes “apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U. S. 281, 285. The two-step framework for deciding extraterritoriality questions asks, first, “whether the presumption . . . has been rebutted.” RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. ___, ___. If not, the second step asks “whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute.” Id., at ___. Courts make the second determination by identifying “the statute’s ‘focus’ ” and then asking whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory. Ibid.If so, the case involves a permissible domestic application of the statute. It is “usually . . . preferable” to begin with step one, but courts have the discretion to begin with step two “in appropriate cases.” Id., at ___, n. 5. The Court exercises that discretion here. Pp. 4–5.

(b) When determining “the statute’s ‘focus’ ”—i.e., “the objec[t] of [its] solicitude,” Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 267—the provision at issue is not analyzed in a vacuum. If it works in tandem with other provisions, it must be assessed in concert with those provisions. Section 284, the Patent Act’s general damages provision, states that “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.” The focus of that provision is “the infringement.” The “overriding purpose” of 284 is to “affor[d] patent owners complete compensation” for infringements. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U. S. 648, 655. Section 271 identifies several ways that a patent can be infringed. Thus, to determine 284’s focus in a given case, the type of infringement that occurred must be identified. Here, 271(f)(2) was the basis for WesternGeco’s infringement claim and the lost-profits damages that it received. That provision regulates the domestic act of “suppl[ying] in or from the United States,” and this Court has acknowledged that it vindicates domestic interests, see, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U. S. 437, 457. In sum, the focus of 284 in a case involving infringement under 271(f)(2) is on the act of exporting components from the United States. So the conduct in this case that is relevant to the statutory focus clearly occurred in the United States. Pp. 5–8.

(c) ION’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. The award of damages is not the statutory focus here. The damages themselves are merely the means by which the statute achieves its end of remedying infringements, and the overseas events giving rise to the lost-profit damages here were merely incidental to the infringement. In asserting that damages awards for foreign injuries are always an extraterritorial application of a damages provision, ION misreads a portion of RJR Nabisco that interpreted a substantive element of a cause of action, not a remedial damages provision. See 579 U. S., at ___. Pp. 8–9.

837 F. 3d 1358, reversed and remanded.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which, Breyer, J., joined.

Currier v. Virginia

Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of Virginia

No. 16-1348. Argued February 20, 2018--Decided June 22, 2018

Petitioner Michael Currier was indicted for burglary, grand larceny, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Because the prosecution could introduce evidence of Mr. Currier’s prior burglary and larceny convictions to prove the felon-in-possession charge, and worried that evidence might prejudice the jury’s consideration of the other charges, Mr. Currier and the government agreed to a severance and asked the court to try the burglary and larceny charges first, followed by a second trial on the felon-in-possession charge. At the first trial, Mr. Currier was acquitted. He then sought to stop the second trial, arguing that it would amount to double jeopardy. Alternatively, he asked the court to prohibit the state from relitigating at the second trial any issue resolved in his favor at the first. The trial court denied his requests and allowed the second trial to proceed unfettered. The jury convicted him on the felon-in-possession charge. The Virginia Court of Appeals rejected his double jeopardy arguments, and the Virginia Supreme Court summarily affirmed.

Held: The judgment is affirmed.

292 Va. 737, 798 S. E. 2d 164, affirmed.

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that, because Mr. Currier consented to a severance, his trial and conviction on the felon-in-possession charge did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, which provides that no person may be tried more than once “for the same offence.” Mr. Currier argues that Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436, requires a ruling for him. There, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a defendant’s prosecution for robbing a poker player because the defendant’s acquittal in a previous trial for robbing a different poker player from the same game established that the defendant “was not one of the robbers,” id., at 446. Ashe’s suggestion that the relitigation of an issue may amount to the impermissible relitigation of an offense represented a significant innovation in this Court’s jurisprudence. But whatever else may be said about Ashe, the Court has emphasized that its test is a demanding one. Ashe forbids a second trial only if to secure a conviction the prosecution must prevail on an issue the jury necessarily resolved in the defendant’s favor in the first trial. A second trial is not precluded simply because it is unlikely—or even very unlikely—that the original jury acquitted without finding the fact in question. To say that the second trial is tantamount to a trial of the same offense as the first and thus forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court must be able to say that it would have been irrational for the jury in the first trial to acquit without finding in the defendant’s favor on a fact essential to a conviction in the second.

Bearing all that in mind, a critical difference emerges between this case and Ashe: Even assuming that Mr. Currier’s second trial qualified as the retrial of the same offense under Ashe, he consented to the second trial. In Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, where theissue was a trial on a greater offense after acquittal on a lesser-included offense, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the defendant “elects to have the . . . offenses tried separately and persuades the trial court to honor his election.” Id., at 152. If consent can overcome a traditional double jeopardy complaint about a second trial for a greater offense, it must also suffice to overcome a double jeopardy complaint under Ashe’s more innovative approach. Holding otherwise would be inconsistent not only with Jeffers but with other cases too. See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U. S. 600. And cases Mr. Currier cites for support, e.g., Harris v. Washington, 404 U. S. 55, merely applied Ashe’s test and concluded that a second trial was impermissible. They do not address the question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a second trial when the defendant consents to it.

Mr. Currier contends that he had no choice but to seek two trials, because evidence of his prior convictions would have tainted thejury’s consideration of the burglary and larceny charges. This is not acase, however, where the defendant had to give up one constitutional right to secure another. Instead, Mr. Currier faced a lawful choice between two courses of action that each bore potential costs and rationally attractive benefits. Difficult strategic choices are “not the same as no choice,” United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U. S. 304, 315, and the Constitution “does not . . . forbid requiring” a litigant to make them, McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213. Pp. 3–8.

Justice Gorsuch, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, concluded in Part III that civil issue preclusion principles cannot be imported into the criminal law through the Double Jeopardy Clause to prevent parties from retrying any issue or introducing any evidence about a previously tried issue. Mr. Currier argues that, even if he consented to a second trial, that consent did not extend to the relitigation of any issues the first jury resolved in his favor. Even assuming for argument’s sake that Mr. Currier’s consent to holding a second trial didn’t more broadly imply consent to the manner it was conducted, his argument must be rejected on a narrower ground as refuted by the text and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and by this Court’s contemporary double jeopardy cases, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299; Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342. Nor is it even clear that civil preclusion principles would help defendants like Mr. Currier. See, e.g., Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U. S. ___, ___. Grafting civil preclusion principles onto the criminal law could also invite ironies—e.g., making severances more costly might make them less freely available. Pp. 8–16.

Justice Kennedy concluded that, because Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion resolve this case in a full and proper way, the extent of the Double Jeopardy Clause protections discussed and defined in Ashe need not be reexamined here. Pp. 1–2.

Gorsuch, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined.

Ortiz v. United States

Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Armed Forces

No. 16-1423. Argued January 16, 2018--Decided June 22, 2018

Congress has long provided for specialized military courts to adjudicate charges against service members. Today, courts-martial hear cases involving crimes unconnected with military service. They are also subject to several tiers of appellate review, and thus are part of an integrated “court-martial system” that resembles civilian structures of justice. That system begins with the court-martial itself, a tribunal that determines guilt or innocence and levies punishment, up to lifetime imprisonment or execution. The next phase occurs at one of four appellate courts: the Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) for the Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard. They review decisions where the sentence is a punitive discharge, incarceration for more than one year, or death. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) sits atop the court-martial system. The CAAF is a “court of record” composed of five civilian judges, 10 U. S. C. 941, which must review certain weighty cases and may review others. Finally, 28 U. S. C. 1259 gives this Court jurisdiction to review the CAAF’s decisions by writ of certiorari.

Petitioner Keanu Ortiz, an Airman First Class, was convicted by a court-martial of possessing and distributing child pornography, and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge. An Air Force CCA panel, including Colonel Martin Mitchell, affirmed that decision. The CAAF then granted Ortiz’s petition for review to consider whether Judge Mitchell was disqualified from serving on the CCA because he had been appointed to the Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR). The Secretary of Defense had initially put Judge Mitchell on the CMCR under his statutory authority to “assign [officers] who are appellate military judges” to serve on that court. 10 U. S. C. 950f(b)(2). To moot a possible constitutional problem with the assignment, the President (with the Senate’s advice and consent) also appointed Judge Mitchell to the CMCR pursuant to 950f(b)(3). Shortly thereafter, Judge Mitchell participated in Ortiz’s CCA appeal.

Ortiz claimed that Judge Mitchell’s CMCR appointment barred his continued CCA service under both a statute and the Constitution. First, he argued that the appointment violated 973(b)(2)(A), which provides that unless “otherwise authorized by law,” an active-duty military officer “may not hold, or exercise the functions of,” certain “civil office[s]” in the federal government. Second, he argued that the Appointments Clause prohibits simultaneous service on the CMCR and the CCA. The CAAF rejected both grounds for ordering another appeal.


1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the CAAF’s decisions. The judicial character and constitutional pedigree of the court-martial system enable this Court, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, to review the decisions of the court sitting at its apex.

An amicus curiae, Professor Aditya Bamzai, argues that cases decided by the CAAF do not fall within Article III’s grant of appellate jurisdiction to this Court. In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, Chief Justice Marshall explained that “the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction” is “that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause.” Id., at 175. Here, Ortiz’s petition asks the Court to “revise and correct” the latest decision in a “cause” that began in and progressed through military justice “proceedings.” Unless Chief Justice Marshall’s test implicitly exempts cases instituted in a military court, the case is now appellate.

There is no reason to make that distinction. The military justice system’s essential character is judicial. Military courts decide cases in strict accordance with a body of federal law and afford virtually the same procedural protections to service members as those given in a civilian criminal proceeding. The judgments a military tribunal renders “rest on the same basis, and are surrounded by the same considerations[, as] give conclusiveness to the judgments of other legal tribunals.” Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23. Accordingly, such judgments have res judicata and Double Jeopardy effect. The jurisdiction and structure of the court-martial system likewise resemble those of other courts whose decisions this Court reviews. Courts-martial try service members for garden-variety crimes unrelated to military service, and can impose terms of imprisonment and capital punishment. Their decisions are also subject to an appellate process similar to the one found in most States. And just as important, the constitutional foundation of courts-martial is not in the least insecure. See Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 79. The court-martial is older than the Constitution, was recognized and sanctioned by the Framers, and has been authorized here since the first Congress. Throughout that history, courts-martial have operated as instruments of military justice, not mere military command. They are bound, like any court, by the fundamental principles of law and the duty to adjudicate cases without partiality.

Bamzai argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the CAAF is not an Article III court, but is instead in the Executive Branch. This Court’s appellate jurisdiction, however, covers more than the decisions of Article III courts. This Court can review proceedings of state courts. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304. It can also review certain non-Article III judicial systems created by Congress. In particular, the Court has upheld its exercise of appellate jurisdiction over decisions of non-Article III territorial courts, see United States v. Coe, 155 U. S. 76, and it has uncontroversially exercised appellate jurisdiction over non-Article III District of Columbia courts, see Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389. The non-Article III court-martial system stands on much the same footing as territorial and D. C. courts. All three rest on an expansive constitutional delegation, have deep historical roots, and perform an inherently judicial role. Thus, in Palmore, this Court viewed the military, territories, and District as “specialized areas having particularized needs” in which Article III “give[s] way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress.” Id., at 408.

Bamzai does not provide a sufficient reason to divorce military courts from territorial and D. C. courts when it comes to defining this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. He first relies on the fact that territorial and D. C. courts exercise power over discrete geographic areas, while military courts do not. But this distinction does not matter to the jurisdictional inquiry. His second argument focuses on the fact that the CAAF is in the Executive Branch. In his view, two of the Court’s precedents—Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243, and Marbury, 1 Cranch 137—show that the Court may never accept appellate jurisdiction from any person or body within that branch. As to Vallandigham, that case goes to show only that not every military tribunal is alike. Unlike the military commission in Vallandigham, which lacked “judicial character,” 1 Wall., at 253, the CAAF is a permanent court of record established by Congress, and its decisions are final unless the Court reviews and reverses them. As to Marbury, James Madison’s failure to transmit William Marbury’s commission was not a judicial decision by a court. Here, by contrast, three constitutionally rooted courts rendered inherently judicial decisions. Pp. 5–19.

2. Judge Mitchell’s simultaneous service on the CCA and the CMCR violated neither 973(b)(2)(A) nor the Appointments Clause. Pp. 19–25.

(a) The statutory issue turns on two interlocking provisions. Section 973(b)(2)(A) is the statute that Ortiz claims was violated here. It prohibits military officers from “hold[ing], or exercis[ing] the functions of,” certain “civil office[s]” in the federal government, “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law.” Section 950f(b) is the statute that the Government claims “otherwise authorize[s]” Judge Mitchell’s CMCR service, even if a seat on that court is a covered “civil office.” It provides two ways to become a CMCR judge. Under 950f(b)(2), the Secretary of Defense “may assign” qualified officers serving on a CCA to be judges on the CMCR. Under 950f(b)(3), the President (with the Senate’s advice and consent) “may appoint” persons—whether officers or civilians is unspecified—to CMCR judgeships.

Ortiz argues that Judge Mitchell was not “authorized by law” to serve on the CMCR after his appointment because 950f(b)(3) makes no express reference to military officers. In the circumstances here, however, the express authorization to assign military officers to the CMCR under 950f(b)(2) was the only thing necessary to exempt Judge Mitchell from 973(b)(2)(A). Once the Secretary of Defense placed Judge Mitchell on the CMCR pursuant to 950f(b)(2), the President’s later appointment made no difference. It did not negate the Secretary’s earlier action, but rather ratified what the Secretary had already done. Thus, after the appointment, Judge Mitchell served on the CMCR by virtue of both the Secretary’s assignment and the President’s appointment. And because 950f(b)(2) expressly authorized the Secretary’s assignment, Judge Mitchell’s CMCR service could not run afoul of 973(b)(2)(A)’s general rule. Pp. 20–23.

(b) Ortiz also raises an Appointments Clause challenge to Judge Mitchell’s simultaneous service on the CCA and the CMCR. That Clause distinguishes between principal officers and inferior officers. CCA judges are inferior officers. Ortiz views CMCR judges as principal officers. And Ortiz argues that, under the Appointments Clause, a single judge cannot serve as an inferior officer on one court and a principal officer on another. But the Court has never read the Appointments Clause to impose rules about dual service, separate and distinct from methods of appointment. And if the Court were ever to apply the Clause to dual-officeholding, it would not start here. Ortiz does not show how Judge Mitchell’s CMCR service would result in “undue influence” on his CCA colleagues. Pp. 23–25.

76 M. J. 125 and 189, affirmed.

Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined.

Carpenter v. United States

Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

No. 16-402. Argued November 29, 2017--Decided June 22, 2018

Cell phones perform their wide and growing variety of functions by continuously connecting to a set of radio antennas called “cell sites.” Each time a phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location information (CSLI). Wireless carriers collect and store this information for their own business purposes. Here, after the FBI identified the cell phone numbers of several robbery suspects, prosecutors were granted court orders to obtain the suspects’ cell phone records under the Stored Communications Act. Wireless carriers produced CSLI for petitioner Timothy Carpenter’s phone, and the Government was able to obtain 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average of 101 data points per day. Carpenter moved to suppress the data, arguing that the Government’s seizure of the records without obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied the motion, and prosecutors used the records at trial to show that Carpenter’s phone was near four of the robbery locations at the time those robberies occurred. Carpenter was convicted. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information with his wireless carriers.


1. The Government’s acquisition of Carpenter’s cell-site records was a Fourth Amendment search. Pp. 4–18.

(a) The Fourth Amendment protects not only property interests but certain expectations of privacy as well. Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351. Thus, when an individual “seeks to preserve something as private,” and his expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,” official intrusion into that sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable cause. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The analysis regarding which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection is informed by historical understandings “of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149. These Founding-era understandings continue to inform this Court when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27. Pp. 4–7.

(b) The digital data at issue—personal location information maintained by a third party—does not fit neatly under existing precedents but lies at the intersection of two lines of cases. One set addresses a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400 (five Justices concluding that privacy concerns would be raised by GPS tracking). The other addresses a person’s expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to third parties. See United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (no expectation of privacy in financial records held by a bank), and Smith, 442 U. S. 735 (no expectation of privacy in records of dialed telephone numbers conveyed to telephone company). Pp. 7–10.

(c) Tracking a person’s past movements through CSLI partakes of many of the qualities of GPS monitoring considered in Jones—it is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled. At the same time, however, the fact that the individual continuously reveals his location to his wireless carrier implicates the third-party principle of Smith and Miller. Given the unique nature of cell-site records, this Court declines to extend Smith and Miller to cover them. Pp. 10–18.

(1) A majority of the Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Allowing government access to cell-site records—which “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life,’ ” Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___, ___—contravenes that expectation. In fact, historical cell-site records present even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring considered in Jones: They give the Government near perfect surveillance and allow it to travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only to the five-year retention policies of most wireless carriers. The Government contends that CSLI data is less precise than GPS information, but it thought the data accurate enough here to highlight it during closing argument in Carpenter’s trial. At any rate, the rule the Court adopts “must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development,” Kyllo, 533 U. S., at 36, and the accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. Pp. 12–15.

(2) The Government contends that the third-party doctrine governs this case, because cell-site records, like the records in Smith and Miller, are “business records,” created and maintained by wireless carriers. But there is a world of difference between the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information casually collected by wireless carriers.

The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared with another. Smith and Miller, however, did not rely solely on the act of sharing. They also considered “the nature of the particular documents sought” and limitations on any “legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ concerning their contents.” Miller, 425 U. S., at 442. In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case the Government fails to appreciate the lack of comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI.

Nor does the second rationale for the third-party doctrine—voluntary exposure—hold up when it comes to CSLI. Cell phone location information is not truly “shared” as the term is normally understood. First, cell phones and the services they provide are “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life” that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society. Riley, 573 U. S., at ___. Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the user’s part beyond powering up. Pp. 15–17.

(d) This decision is narrow. It does not express a view on matters not before the Court; does not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras; does not address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information; and does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security. Pp. 17–18.

2. The Government did not obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring Carpenter’s cell-site records. It acquired those records pursuant to a court order under the Stored Communications Act, which required the Government to show “reasonable grounds” for believing that the records were “relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” 18 U. S. C. 2703(d). That showing falls well short of the probable cause required for a warrant. Consequently, an order issued under 2703(d) is not a permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Not all orders compelling the production of documents will require a showing of probable cause. A warrant is required only in the rare case where the suspect has a legitimate privacy interest in records held by a third party. And even though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific exceptions—e.g., exigent circumstances—may support a warrantless search. Pp. 18–22.

819 F. 3d 880, reversed and remanded.

Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion.