GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Defendant Michael D. Camiscione pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(4) and (b)(2). Although the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentencing range of 27 to 33 months of imprisonment, the district court sentenced Camiscione to the custody of the United States Marshal’s Service for the remainder of the day, followed by three years of supervised release and 180 hours of community service. After the government appealed Camiscione’s sentence to this court, we held that Camiscione’s sentence was procedurally reasonable but substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to explain adequately how its sentence “deterred Camiscione from committing future crimes, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(B); protected the public from further crimes, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(2)(C); and . . . avoided sentencing disparities, see [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)(6).” United States v. Camiscione, 207 F. App’x 631, 637 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“Camiscione I”). Accordingly, we vacated Camiscione’s sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing.

On remand, and more than a year-and-a-half after our mandate in Camiscione I issued, the district court reimposed its original sentence upon Camiscione. In this appeal, the government contends that, even under an abuse-of-discretion scope of review, Camiscione’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. We agree because the district court imposed a sentence upon Camiscione without considering general deterrence to the population at large and articulating how it avoids unwarranted sentence disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Therefore, we again vacate Camiscione’s sentence and remand to the district court for expeditious resentencing.