MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. The defendant, Ricco Lamonte Maye, pleaded guilty to charges of distributing more than five grams of crack cocaine and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced Maye to consecutive prison terms of 78 months and 60 months, respectively. The defendant now contends that: (1) the district judge improperly denied him a three-level reduction in his guideline sentencing range for acceptance of responsibility; (2) the prosecution failed to establish a factual basis for the firearm offense; (3) the drug sentence unreasonably failed to take into account the unwarranted disparity between sentencing ranges for crack cocaine and powder cocaine; and (4) the district court should have retroactively applied sentencing guideline amendments to Maye’s case so as to reduce the defendant’s criminal history category. For the reasons discussed below, we find merit in Maye’s second and third allegations of error, vacate his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and remand this matter to the district court for a new plea acceptance hearing and a new sentencing hearing.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Kenta Raynard Moore (“Moore”) appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan denying his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On appeal, Moore contends that the district court improperly found that he had distributed at least 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base, thus making him ineligible for a reduction. For the following reasons, the district court’s denial of a sentence reduction for Moore is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED so that the district court may reconsider the merits of Moore’s motion.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Lawrence Reynolds, an inmate on death row in the State of Ohio, has moved for a stay of his execution, currently set for October 8, 2009. Reynolds’ current motion is based on an Eighth Amendment challenge to the Ohio lethal injection protocol. As a general proposition, this claim is currently barred by the twoyear statute of limitations that we put in place in Cooey v. Strickland (Cooey II), 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007), reh’g denied en banc, 489 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2007). However, after we decided Cooey II, Ohio revised its execution protocol in May 2009 and experienced serious and troubling difficulties in executing at least three inmates, most recently Romell Broom. These disturbing issues give rise to at least two questions: first, whether Ohio is fully and competently adhering to the Ohio lethal injection protocol given (a) their failure to have a contingency plan in place should peripheral vein access be impossible, (b) issues related to the competence of the lethal injection team, and (c) other potential deficiencies; and second, whether these instances present sufficient new, additional factors to revive Reynolds’ Eighth Amendment claims otherwise extinguished by Cooey II.

Broom’s arguments about these very issues will be heard before the Honorable Gregory Frost of the United States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio; to permit this, his execution has been stayed until at least November 30, 2009. Given the important constitutional and humanitarian issues at stake in all death penalty cases, these problems in the Ohio lethal injection protocol are certainly worthy of meaningful consideration. Judge Frost is best positioned to conduct a comprehensive review of these issues for both Reynolds and Broom.

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby GRANT Reynolds’ motion for a stay of execution and REMAND his case to Judge Frost for fact-finding and evidentiary hearings on the merits of his arguments.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Rabbers (“Rabbers”) challenges the district court’s decision affirming the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits by Defendant-Appellee Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). Rabbers argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to make specific findings regarding the severity of his mental impairment—bipolar disorder—as required by the regulations. He also argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of his treating source, Dr. Bobga Fomunung, in determining that his bipolar disorder did not meet the criteria of a listed impairment.

The ALJ clearly did not make the required findings regarding the severity of Rabbers’s mental impairment. We conclude, however, that this error was harmless. It did not deprive Rabbers of a substantial procedural right. Nor did it prejudice him on the merits, as the administrative record indicates that his bipolar disorder was not severe enough to render him disabled. In fact, the ALJ properly rejected the only evidence in the record that would have supported a contrary conclusion: the opinion of Dr. Fomunung. We therefore affirm the decision of the district court.